A dollar that compounds with a real-asset portfolio, with equity beneath it and a launchpad above it.

Non-goals

Normalized factor inputs

D2% is aggregate depth available before a 2% move, Qexit is the modeled emergency-sale amount, and F50/M50 are governance-set saturation constants. Final calibration should use log-scaled or empirical transforms if simulations show these simple curves misprice large assets.

Illustrative asset classes

Portfolio-level stress target

For scenario s, let r_i,s be the fraction of asset i retained after stress and w_i its current portfolio weight.

If a gold-only portfolio is modeled to retain 80% of value, 120% starting capitalization leaves only 96% after the shock. Exact 100% coverage requires 125%; preserving 110% coverage requires 137.5%.

Stable-reserve target

At a 20% contraction objective and a $0.95 maximum average purchase price, the mechanical requirement is 19% of supply. The 25% baseline adds operational and market-making separation.

Rebalancing policy

1. Change bond capacity and reward: underweight assets receive better vPLUS terms; assets at cap stop accepting bonds.
2. Redirect cash flows: income, maturities, and new stable reserves refill deficient buckets.
3. Direct treasury trade: execute only outside permitted bands or when a risk event requires immediate action.
4. Recovery liquidation: sell growth assets only after less destructive tools are inadequate.

System constraints

For new asset value V, selected USD++ x, current assets A, supply S, and post-bond target C_after:

The post-bond target is recalculated from the resulting portfolio. A diversifying asset may lower aggregate risk; a concentration-increasing asset may raise it.

Corrected (3,3) point

The recommendation must not spend headroom created by earlier fee burns, retained profit, or capital-heavy bonds. Evaluate the pre-bond headroom under the post-bond target:

When the system is already at or above a fixed target, this simplifies to x_3,3 = min(V·F_i, V/C). At 150%, a $100 bond independently supports about 66.67 USD++ while preserving prior headroom.

vPLUS quote and accretion

Let B be the bond’s target market-value compensation, P_x the USD++ TWAP, P_PLUS the PLUS market price, and N_PLUS PLUS hard NAV. Above peg, issued USD++ is valued at its market price; below peg, the quote does not compensate the bonder for the depeg.

When PLUS trades materially above hard NAV, paying market-value compensation in vPLUS is cheaper in hard economic terms than issuing equal market value in USD++. The protocol must still account for circulating supply, future sell pressure, finite reserve consumption, and lower demand for all-PLUS bonds.

Peg-state behavior

Vesting and supply discipline

Bond rewards are paid as vPLUS with a provisional 7-day linear vest, configurable within a 5–14 day constitutional range. The purpose is to prevent instant bond arbitrage without missing fast DeFi attention cycles. Recursion is controlled by finite capacity and dynamic pricing, not indefinite lockups.

Two values, two purposes

Source ownership

Profit recognition ledger

Negative P&L reduces unissued credits first, then becomes loss carryforward. Later gains repair that carryforward before creating new credits. Deposits therefore cannot masquerade as yield, and a fall-and-recovery cycle cannot be paid twice.

First-loss compensation rule

At m = 2 and C target = 150%, USD++ and PLUS each receive 50% of eligible profit. Because PLUS equity is smaller than USD++ supply, PLUS earns twice USD++’s percentage return.

Release policy

• Below peg: release zero credits.
• Near peg: release slowly under the epoch cap.
• Above peg: accelerate release before paid issuance, because the value is already allocated to existing holders.
• Recovery Mode: stop all releases.

Rebase mechanics

The global index update is O(1). wUSD++ provides a fixed-balance claim whose exchange rate tracks the index and is the settlement asset used by canonical v4 pools.

v4 oracle and policy hook

Uniswap v4 requires custom historical oracle functionality. Because the pool uses fixed-balance wUSD++, the hook does not need to rewrite concentrated-liquidity accounting for rebases. It must:

• Normalize price: if one wUSD++ represents index I USD++ and the pool price is P_w USDC/wUSD++, then P_USD++ = P_w / I.
• Checkpoint index changes: store normalized observations so a new wrapper rate is never applied retroactively to old prices.
• Authorize bounded policy calls: expose TWAP, time-weighted liquidity, cooldown, and price-limit checks to the PegController.
• Classify fees: exclude protocol stabilization trades from external platform revenue.

Treasury-managed liquidity ranges

Above-peg order

1. Release earned Monetary Dividend credits within all constraints.
2. Mint USD++, wrap, and sell wUSD++ atomically when TWAP, spot, liquidity, and capitalization authorize it.
3. Continue diversified RWA bonds, valuing the USD++ payout at market and reducing vPLUS accordingly.

Below-peg order

The protocol first buys from the pool while the next marginal all-in USD++-equivalent price is no greater than the Inverse Reserve Bond quote. Only residual contraction demand is offered to inverse bonders.

Oracle safeguards

• TWAP authorizes policy; spot and active liquidity size execution.
• Reserve outflows require longer confirmation than paid expansion.
• Use a fixed observation buffer, minimum time-weighted liquidity, epoch caps, cooldowns, and later multi-venue confirmation.
• Protocol actions are excluded from organic volume and external fee revenue.

Eligible fee sources

Excluded from the Builder Share

• Bonded RWA principal and PLUS capital-raising proceeds
• USD++ issuance, burns, rebases, pool stabilization, and Inverse Reserve Bond principal
• RWA interest, dividends, and capital gains
• Treasury rebalancing and custody movements
• Internal fees paid by the protocol to liquidity it substantially owns

Why permanent fee burns strengthen the joint growth loop

At target capitalization C, a USD++ burn b can support later 1:1 paid issuance y while preserving the burn-funded PLUS equity gain:

At 150%, a $1 permanent burn can support $3 of later 1:1 paid USD++ issuance. If that demand arrives, $3 of new external assets enter while the original $1 equity improvement remains. If demand does not arrive, the protocol simply retains a larger safety buffer.

Builder alignment

The builders also receive a long-vested PLUS allocation, but founder PLUS has no preferential claim, enhanced dividend, or superior liquidation right. A baseline allocation is 15% of fully diluted supply with a one-year cliff and three-year linear vest. The team therefore benefits from both:

• cash flow proportional to genuine platform use; and
• long-term appreciation from preserving the protocol growth system.

Provisional fee architecture

These fee rates were not settled in prior design work and are explicitly provisional. They belong in conversion and wash-trading simulations before implementation.

Launchpad security defaults

• Use standardized, immutable token and curve templates where possible.
• Graduation liquidity must be permanently locked or controlled by a non-ruggable vault.
• Simulate buy and sell paths before listing; detect transfer restrictions, hidden taxes, owner drains, and honeypot behavior.
• Do not use raw volume, transaction count, or market cap as a PLUS reward input.
• Clearly separate platform discovery from an endorsement of any launched token.
• Rate-limit creation and malicious metadata without making the monetary protocol dependent on discretionary moderation.

Genesis exit conditions

• Risk-derived capitalization target reached with safety margin
• Free stable-reserve target reached
• USD++/USDC and USD++/PLUS markets meet explicit depth targets
• PLUS ownership distribution and vesting concentration pass thresholds
• USD++ peg remains within band for a sustained observation window
• RWA custody and oracle redundancy are operational

Genesis bond emissions stop when conditions are met or the Genesis budget is exhausted. Any temporary restriction on competing PLUS AMM pools ends at the earlier of Genesis completion or a hard sunset, provisionally 90 days. Genesis economic incentives may continue longer without transfer restrictions.

Provisional PLUS allocation

All committed supply is included in fully diluted PLUS accounting from inception. Unused Genesis allocations should remain reserved or be subject to a future burn decision rather than being emitted merely because they were budgeted.

Post-Genesis sustainability

The system must function with zero routine PLUS emissions. Sustainable sources are:

• RWA portfolio profit;
• launchpad and canonical-market fees;
• permanent USD++ burns;
• paid RWA-backed USD++ issuance;
• organic demand from the launchpad ecosystem; and
• opportunistic, strictly bounded PLUS issuance when the market offers an accretive trade.

Stage 2: pool-first contraction

If the protocol can purchase USD++ in the pool for less than the reserve value offered by an inverse bond, it should capture that discount itself. The controller buys to a maximum marginal price, burns output in the same transaction, and stops before becoming a predictable unlimited bid.

Stage 3: Inverse Reserve Bonds

For one USD++ burned in exchange for q dollars of external reserve assets:

The bond is accretive while giving arbitrageurs a spread over the secondary-market price. It is capacity-limited by free reserves, epoch outflow limits, and portfolio safety.

Stage 4: relative-value PLUS contraction

Define PLUS’s market-to-hard-NAV ratio:

There exists an accretive reward that a user will accept only when:

If USD++ is $0.80 and PLUS trades at 90% of NAV, the protocol can offer between $0.80 and $0.90 of PLUS market value per USD++ burned. The user profits, while the hard-NAV cost remains below the $1 claim eliminated.

Stage 6: emergency negative rebase

If conservative resolution assets are A_R and USD++ supply is S, the cleanest final haircut is:

This restores approximately 100% asset coverage without transferring value from USD++ holders to surviving PLUS holders. The higher normal capitalization target is rebuilt afterward through new PLUS capital, retained earnings, and fee burns.

Trigger design

Trigger values are provisional. Simulations must optimize them against depeg duration, reserve exhaustion, false activation, and manipulation cost.

Risk aggregation

Atomic bond transaction

1. Pull and value the approved RWA. The asset enters TreasuryVault before any USD++ or vPLUS is issued.
2. Preview the post-bond portfolio. RiskEngine derives the new C target, exposure state, and mode-specific USD++ ceiling from aggregate state.
3. Quote one permitted bond mode. BondAuctioneer prices USD++ at the protected TWAP, computes vPLUS at the current market/NAV relationship, and enforces capacity.
4. Enforce the post-state before settlement. All asset caps, issuance limits, reserve rules, and PLUS hard-accretion requirements must pass atomically.
5. Settle once. Treasury retains the asset, USD++ is minted to the bonder, and a fixed vPLUS vesting claim is created in the same transaction.

Atomic above-peg expansion

1. Authorize with the normalized oracle. Both the secured TWAP and spot price must remain above the upper band, with sufficient time-weighted liquidity.
2. Compute a bounded mint. The amount is the minimum of paid-issuance capacity, active pool demand, the epoch cap, and the caller’s limit.
3. Mint only for immediate execution. USD++ is wrapped into wUSD++ and sold into the canonical pool to a hard normalized price boundary; USDC proceeds transfer directly to TreasuryVault.
4. Burn any unfilled amount. Any unfilled wUSD++ is unwrapped and the corresponding USD++ is burned before the transaction completes.
5. Verify the final balance sheet. The transaction reverts unless post-trade capitalization, reserve accounting, and pool deltas satisfy every invariant.

Keeper incentives

Routine accounting, rebalancing, and policy calls may pay bounded keeper bounties from explicit operating budgets. Bounties must never be proportional to manipulable spot volume. Critical actions remain permissionless once objective conditions are met, but execute within epoch caps and price limits.

Parameter governance classes

Role and upgrade model

• Governance: slow constitutional and treasury-policy changes.
• Risk council: bounded asset pauses, factor reductions, and cap reductions; cannot increase risk beyond timelocked limits.
• Emergency council: pause affected modules and accelerate defensive restrictions; cannot transfer treasury assets or trigger a negative rebase unilaterally.
• Keepers: permissionless or allowlisted executors with no discretion beyond contract-calculated amounts.
• Builder organization: recipient of the Builder Share, with no privileged monetary claim or unilateral control over treasury principal.

Parameter sweeps

Agent model

• USD++ holders: demand depends on expected yield, peg history, liquidity, and launchpad utility.
• PLUS investors: price future fees, portfolio growth, dilution, first-loss risk, and recovery seniority.
• Bonders: choose modes based on immediate USD++ value, PLUS discount, vesting, volatility, and alternatives.
• Arbitrageurs: exploit above/below peg opportunities subject to fees, capacity, and latency.
• Launchpad users: react to token novelty, creator economics, routing friction, and fee levels.
• Attackers: manipulate oracles, wash trade, sandwich recovery, concentrate custody risk, and exploit stale parameters.

Minimum scenario suite

Formal and software verification

• Foundry invariant tests for every algebraic invariant in this document
• Differential tests against a high-precision Python/Rust reference model
• Stateful fuzzing across bonds, rebases, fee burns, hook swaps, and recovery transitions
• Symbolic checks for integer overflow, rounding direction, and inaccessible recovery states
• Lean or another theorem prover for issuance, profit split, recovery accretion, and resolution seniority
• Economic Monte Carlo and adversarial agent-based simulation before choosing constants
• Fork tests against the selected Uniswap v4 deployment and RWA token implementations